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This working paper reports some of the initial findings of a research project that is to be conducted from 
Jan 06 to Dec 07. Please note that it is work in progress. 
  
An estimate should, ideally, be an objectively obtained number that tells us the resources 
needed to complete a project. Such a number is important because it, in theory, allows the 
developing company to present a plan and a price to the customer. Numbers presented by 
different bidders can be compared, and the customer can then choose the most interesting 
alternative. Hence, the function of this ideal estimate seems to be, on one side, to allow for 
realistic pricing and planning of a project and, on the other, to allow for comparisons. 
However, everybody seems to know, and accept, that estimates are neither objective nor al-
ways accurate. Occasionally, they may even be totally artificial. And nevertheless, estimations 
are still carried out, offered and considered essential. Probably the reason behind this, as will 
be argued in the continuation, is that the most elemental function of an estimate is not to 
offer the correct answer to “How much will this project cost?” but rather to reduce different 
kinds of uncertainties that make decision-making impossible. In the process of obtaining the 
estimates, and thus of reducing those uncertainties, other goals are accomplished, such as that 
of encouraging engagement and motivation and that of particularizing the specifications. The 
ideal goal, that of giving a correct answer to “How much will this project cost (or how long 




The book that perhaps deals best with the notion of uncertainty in organizations is James D. 
Thompson’s Organizations in Action, originally published in 1967. The main tenant in this 
book is based on a double assumption: 
On one side, in order to achieve maximum effectivity, organizations need to operate under 
conditions of total certainty. Such conditions would make it possible to plan and structure 
the organization in an optimal manner. 
On the other side, conditions of total certainty are impossible to achieve. Thompson’s book 
discusses the effects of “irregularities stemming from external sources” (:12); leaving aside ir-
regularities that originate from internal sources. 
Now, Not all of what Thompson says in that work is directly transposable to our study but 
the essential idea is: 
 
… the central problem for complex organizations is one of coping with uncer-
tainty. As a point of departure, we suggest that organizations cope with un-
certainty by creating certain parts specifically to deal with it, specializing 
other parts in operating under conditions of certainty or near certainty. (:p13) 
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We shall not look at parts created in order to deal with uncertainty but at numbers (esti-
mates) created to deal with uncertainty so as to allow the organization to act as if under con-
ditions of (near) certainty. Let us now see what uncertainties an estimate reduces, both on the 
developer’s and on the customer’s side. 
Speaking in general terms, deciding to get on with an IT project means involving oneself with 
uncertainties. The most pressing one is that of whether the system can be carried out at all, a 
question highlighted in Software Runaways (Glass 97), where the author presents a number of 
IT projects that collapsed under way. In the cases we have studied, however, the projects are 
of such a nature that this question is seldom actual. 
Two other important uncertainties that do apply to all our cases are: 1) when will the project 
be finished; and 2) how much it should cost. The most obvious way to eliminate this uncer-
tainties is to find the correct answer to the questions. Unfortunately, no-one seems to know 
how to calculate those numbers in a correct way. So instead, the answer to these questions is 
first offered as an estimate, then negotiated and finally agreed upon and included in a con-
tract. This process reduces the uncertainties for both the developer and the customer. They 
both need an agreed-upon estimate: the customer in order to plan the budget and the intro-
duction of the system, training, new routines, etc.; the developer in order to plan its develop-
ment (and other parallel developments that might exist). 
It might feel counter-intuitive to think of a way to reduce the above-mentioned uncertainties 
that does not include objective and accurate estimates. But this is a misconception: the un-
certainty is present at the beginning of the project, and at this date what is needed is a believ-
able number to agree upon. Once this number has been agreed upon, the uncertainty has 
been reduced. It has not been eliminated because everyone knows that estimates can be 
wrong, but both customer and developer can now move on. They can both plan the coming 
activities and start working on them. 
Estimates are, as I mentioned above, not always accurate, and gravely optimistic ones (we 
shall ignore the case of pessimistic estimates since they seem practically not to exist) will give 
raise to problems. Everyone is aware of this, but those problems lie ahead and the current 
processes can be carried out without disturbance. In fact, those future problems may very 
well be insurmountable, be indeed so grave so as to throw companies out of business (cf. 
Glass 97); so I am not suggesting that any number will do as an estimate simply because both 
customer and developer have agreed upon it.  
Early estimates should naturally be as accurate as possible, but they do not need to be in order 
to reduce the uncertainty present at the beginning of the project. This is essential because it 
explains why companies can do well without perfectly unfailing estimation practices: they 
have established mechanisms that allow them to adapt the project to the estimate: 
•  Well dimensioned buffers. 
•  pre-study phases. 
•  formal modifications to the specifications which entail re-estimations. 
•  trimming of the original specifications. 
•  developers ready to work under extreme conditions.         
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This mechanism can be implemented differently: developers that love programming, radical 
management routines, etc. We have not come across this kind of mechanisms in our cases but 
it can be found and commented in much of the literature about software development pro-
jects. Kidder’s The soul of a new machine tells a good story and is a great place to study devel-
opment under extreme conditions. 
Another important uncertainty that is seldom considered but that has great effect in the pro-
ject is that of unclear specifications. As one of our interviewees said regarding how much in-
formation they had to build the first estimate on: “… while other customers phone you up on 
monday and want a price on friday.” Or as another said, more moderately: “the received speci-
fications hold varied quality and they set the standard for what is possible to estimate.” The 
estimate itself, the number, does not reduce this specifications uncertainty, but some process 
of estimation do, as we shall see in the following section. 
 
Clarifying the specifications  
 
As mentioned above, one of the greatest risks in a software development project seems to be 
unclear specifications. Theoretically, unclear specifications should not be allowed into a pro-
ject, but in reality they very often are. Estimates, per se, are not directed towards clarifying 
specifications, but we have seen that the process of estimating a project will often result in a 
clarification of the specifications. 
One can identify two main steps in the clarification of specifications: the first one has to do 
with obtaining specifications of at least a certain level of detail, to avoid the monday-to-friday 
specifications situation cited above. Being forced to offer an estimate will both urge develop-
ers not to accept poor specifications and offer them the justification to require more detailed 
documents: they can argue it is also in the customer’s interest to provide with as clear re-
quirements as possible. 
The second step in the clarification of specifications has to do with their vagueness. Specifi-
cations are seldom, if ever, written so that they can simply be programmed directly, they are 
often riddled with ambiguities. This seems to occur in practice regardless of the detail of the 
specifications. Ideally, this should not be so, requirements phase properly carried out should 
result in detailed, unambiguous specifications. I wouldn’t go as far as saying that unambiguous 
specifications are a metaphysical impossibility but they are most certainly a practical impossi-
bility. Helen Ullman (1997) puts it very convincingly: 
 
The “system” comes to [the programmers] done on paper, in English. “All” 
they have to do is write the code. But somewhere in that translation between 
the paper and the code, the clarity breaks down. [...] As the months of coding 
go on, the irregularities of human thinking start to emerge. You write some 
code, and suddenly there are dark, unspecified ideas. All the pages of careful 
documents,  and  still,  between  the  sentences,  something  is  missing.  Human 
thinking can skip over a great deal, leap over small misunderstandings, can 
contain ifs and buts in untroubled corners of the mind. But the machine has        
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no corners. [...]Now starts a process of frustration. The programmer goes back 
to the analysts with questions, the analysts to the users, the users to their 
managers, the managers back to the analysts, the analysts to the programmers. 
It turns out that some things are just not understood. No one knows the an-
swers to some questions. Or worse, there are too many answers. A long list of 
exceptional situations is revealed, things that occur very rarely but that occur 
all the same. Should these be programmed? Yes, of course. How else will the 
system do the work human beings need to accomplish? Details and exceptions 
accumulate [...] (:21) 
 
One of the effects of being forced to produce an accurate estimate is that the specifications 
must be studied with extra intensity: vague descriptions must be concretized and ambiguities 
identified and solved. The specifications will seldom be as profoundly studied as when they 
must be implemented in code, but an estimate based on them will require they be analyzed 
attentively. From our interviews we have gathered that this study is the process that leads to a 
Work Breakdown Structure, which is then used to estimate the effort of the project and fur-
ther to write a plan for it. This plan is based on the sequence of the tasks (which ones must be 
ordered sequentially and which ones can be carried out in parallel) and the estimated length 
of each task. All these three activities (outlining of a WBS, late estimation and planning) are 
closely related and it may be misleading to think of them in different terms. 
In sum, being forced to carry out a late estimate will have as a result an interested analysis of 
the specifications and a more detailed action plan. These two activities should of course be 
carried out regardless of the obligation of producing a low-level estimate, but such a require-
ment will make them even more likely to happen. 
 
Delegation and motivation: internal negotiations and in-
volvement 
 
In a such a knowledge intensive industry as software development, there is nothing as impor-
tant as assuring loyalty and motivation among the people who develop the system (architects, 
designers, programmers, testers, etc.). The management literature on how to enhance motiva-
tion and create loyalty would probably fill whole libraries and there is little point in going 
through it here. Nevertheless, it seems plausible to suggest the following two ideas: 
1) An estimation process based on a calculation carried out centrally (by higher management 
or external estimation experts, for instance) and whose results are later distributed and forced 
upon the developing team will not enhance motivation and allegiance to the established dead-
lines. It doesn’t need to, and ideally it won’t, disturb motivation, but there is a risk. Particu-
larly if the estimate is an aggressive one. It goes without saying that the question of the devel-
opment team’s relationship to aggressive estimates made by external (to the project) actors is 
very complex and that factors such as the corporate culture or the charisma – or reputation – 
of the “estimator” will play an essential role in how those deadlines are experienced.        
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2) Distributed estimation, organized by a manager but carried out by the development team, 
stands, everything else equal, a better chance at enhancing motivation and loyalty. In this 
case, the estimation is in fact a process of negotiation among members of the development 
team and also between them and the project manager (in some cases, the project manager will 
team up with the developers and negotiate with some “higher” managers). Practices included 
in that process – such as meetings, arguments, discussions, formal and informal questions di-
rectly posed to the developers, etc. – offer the stage upon which negotiations are carried out 
and agreements are made. These agreements are in fact the development team’s promises 
about when (and at what effort) tasks will be delivered. The essential aspect here is that de-
velopers themselves make the promises, creating an environment of self-discipline. The goals 
of the project have now been internalized by the developers and the following mechanisms 
are generally activated: 
Shame and honor. Breaking one’s promises is reason to feel ashamed, simply because we are 
brought up with the maxim that one should not break one’s promises. However banal this 
observation is, the force of shame in organizational processes must not be underestimated. It 
would be very interesting to make a detailed study of the different reasons offered when a 
deadline is missed. It would probably tell us a lot about the way in which the broad maxim 
presented above has been adopted at the organization and, hence, about its corporate culture. 
Professional pride. Related to the previous one but not the same. Missing a deadline that you 
have proposed yourself does not only mean you’ve broken your promise, it also means that 
you a) aren’t a developer good enough to be able to make realistic estimates; and / or b) aren’t 
a developer good enough to meet realistic deadlines. Developers, as many other professions, 
quickly establish meritocracies that order them in different classes. In the case of program-
mers this may be reinforced by the fact that the literature insists that star programmers are 
ten to twenty times more productive than normal programmers. 
In one of our cases, we found that estimates made by developers were formalized into con-
tracts. The answer to the question “How long do you think this will take?” was in fact “I 
hereby sign a contract between my project manager and myself where I guarantee that this 
task will be delivered by such and such a date.” The effects that such a formalization may have 
on the developer’s internalization of the project’s goals is difficult to speculate about. It is 
clear, however, that a promise, which is something exchanged between humans, has now been 
turned into a contract, which is something exchanged between juridical entities. A simple 
theoretical analysis might say that the following alternatives are open: 
1) the contract is just a waste of paper. Both developers and project managers know that it 
carries no practical force – i.e. it is not referred to in further discussions and it won’t be used 
in case of delays – and that what is important is the agreement reached between them as col-
leagues and perhaps as friends. In such a situation the contract has no effect on the internali-
zation. 
2) the contract is referred to in case of a delay, but only as some sort of vague threat. There 
are no concrete economic or organizational consequences for the individual (such as withheld 
bonus or relegation). Will that vague threat enhance the developer’s motivation? I guess it 
depends on the developer’s personality, and I believe it must be used with care.        
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3) the contract includes clearly stated economic and / or organizational consequences for the 
individual. Both positive and negative (bonus if the deadline is met and withheld bonus is it is 
missed). Once the promise has been transformed into a purely formal contract, the personal 
mechanisms of shame and pride are likely to weaken. Whether the economic ambitions may 
counterbalance this loss will depend on the developer’s personality. At any rate, economic 
promises are not excluded from a non-contractual system. 
Since we have no empirical cases, these are all speculations, but I thought the discussion 
would be incomplete without them. As it would be incomplete if we do not mention the 
question of the role played by estimation “experts”, those developers whose opinions weight 
much more than others. We have seen that in some companies there was a number of pro-
grammers whose estimates set the standard. No project estimate is concluded until they have 
had the chance to study the project and proposed an estimate. In fact, and this is the interest-
ing aspect, it appears that estimates made by other developers may be changed if they do not 
coincide with theirs. Without wanting to speculate in this issue, it appears that motivation 
and loyalty to the new estimates should not be as high as to the estimates made by the devel-
opers themselves. Unless, of course, these star estimators are also star developers, occupy the 
highest ladder of the developers’ hierarchy and are therefore greatly admired. In which case, 
the effect might actually be to enhance the motivation. But the exact effects will most likely 
vary from case to case and with time. 
 
Establishment of sponsorship 
 
One of the most important success factors listed by software project management literature 
in is that of assuring support from higher management, something also called “sponsorship.” 
This factor does sound commonsensical but we are not in a position to neither deny it nor 
confirm it. In the course of our interviews we seldom came across this sort of ideas, but we 
have no good reasons to believe that “sponsorship” plays no role in the success of a project. It 
would of course be very interesting to study it in the future. 
This said, however, it is interesting to notice that early estimates (high level) are often done 
by “higher management”, in cases with the aid of project managers or even developers. One 
would expect that the “higher” manager that proposed this early estimate will have reason to 
feel involved with it, particularly considering the weight early estimates have. However, it is 
not clear whether this involvement will have positive or negative effects. Hopefully, the esti-
mate is realistic and the project will benefit from the sponsorship, which may solve some – 
administrative, for instance – concerns faster. But the early estimate may also be too optimis-
tic, and the sponsorship may turn into an intensified pressure to keep that impossible budget 
and deadline, which may have disastrous consequences – at this point I recommend the book 
Deathmarch (Yourdon 03) to those readers curious about severe project conditions. 
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 Pink Machine is the name of a research project currently carried out at the Department of Industrial
Economics and Management at the Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm. It aims to study the
often forgotten non-serious driving forces of technical and economical development. We live indeed
in the reality of the artificial, one in which technology has created, constructed and reshaped almost
everything that surrounds us. If we look around us in the modern world, we see that it consists of
things,  of artefacts.  Even  the  immaterial  is  formed  and  created  by  technology -  driven  by  the
imperative of the economic rationale.
As Lev Vygotsky and Susanne Langer have pointed out, all things around us, all these technological
wonders, have their first origin in someone’s  fantasies, dreams,  hallucinations and  visions. These
things, which through their demand govern local and global economical processes, have little to do
with what we usually regard as “basic human needs”. It is rather so, it could be argued, that the
economy  at large is governed by human’s unbounded thirst for jewellery, toys and entertainment. For
some reason - the inherent urge of science for being taken seriously, maybe - these aspects have been
recognised only in a very limited way within technological and economical research.
The seriousness of science is grey, Goethe said, whereas the colour of life glows green. We want to
bring forward yet another colour, that of frivolity, and it is pink.
The Pink Machine Papers is our attempt to widen the perspective a bit, to give science a streak of
pink. We would like to create a forum for half-finished scientific reports, of philosophical guesses and
drafts. We want thus to conduct a dialogue which is based on current research and which gives us the
opportunity to present our scientific ideas before we develop them into concluding and rigid - grey -
reports and theses.
Finally: the name “Pink Machine” comes from an interview carried out in connection with heavy
industrial constructions, where the buyer of a diesel power plant worth several hundred million dollars
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